Video planet ("vp") sells a big screen tv package consisting of a 60-inch plasma tv, a universal remote, and on-site installation by vp staff. the installation includes programming the remote to have the tv interface with other parts of the customer�s home entertainment system. vp concludes that the tv, remote and installation service are separate performance obligations. vp sells the 60-inch tv separately for $1,970 and sells the remote separately for $210, and offers the entire package for $2,340. vp does not sell the installation service separately. vp is aware that other similar vendors charge $260 for the installation service. vp also estimates that it incurs approximately $210 of compensation and other costs for vp staff to provide the installation service. vp typically charges 50% above cost on similar sales.

required:
calculate the stand-alone price of the installation service using each of the following approaches.
1 adjusted market assessment
2. expected cost plus margin
3. residual

The 39 percent and 38 percent tax rates both represent what is called a tax "bubble." suppose the government wanted to lower the upper threshold of the 39 percent marginal tax bracket from $335,000 to $208,000. what would the new 39 percent bubble rate have to be? (do not round intermediate calculations. enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places,e.g., 32.16.)

Suppose that each country completely specializes in the production of the good in which it has a comparative advantage, producing only that good. in this case, the country that produces jeans will produce million pairs per week, and the country that produces corn will produce million bushels per week.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?