Look at this design closely. which of the following is true? a. it is an advertisement that is not recognizable to the general public. b.it was originally produced using a printing method known as silkscreen. c.the typeface is a type of sans-serif font. d.the woman in the center is an artist replica of the founder of the company.

Vulcan flyovers offers scenic overflights of mount st. helens, the volcano in washington state that explosively erupted in 1982. data concerning the company’s operations in july appear below: vulcan flyovers operating data for the month ended july 31 actual results flexible budget planning budget flights (q) 56 56 54 revenue ($350.00q) $ 16,500 $ 19,600 $ 18,900 expenses: wages and salaries ($3,300 + $91.00q) 8,354 8,396 8,214 fuel ($31.00q) 1,904 1,736 1,674 airport fees ($870 + $35.00q) 2,730 2,830 2,760 aircraft depreciation ($11.00q) 616 616 594 office expenses ($240 + $1.00q) 464 296 294 total expense 14,068 13,874 13,536 net operating income $ 2,432 $ 5,726 $ 5,364 the company measures its activity in terms of flights. customers can buy individual tickets for overflights or hire an entire plane for an overflight at a discount. required: 1. prepare a flexible budget performance report for july that includes revenue and spending variances and activity variances.

Using the smith's bbq report, the cost of wine for next week will increase by 2% from the current week. if all other cost of sales stays constant, what will be the approximate total cost of sales for next week?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?