Oven looks at his account and notices that if the current monthly interest rate stays constant he is expected to have $45,000 in 6 years (i. e. once 6 years have elapsed) and $89,000 in 9 years. (15 points) (a) how much money does he have now (at time 0)? (5 points) (b) if his predictions are correct, except after 7 years, the nominal rate halves and then stays at that value, how much money will he have in 9 years? assume the interest rate is compounded monthly. (10 points)

Why should managers invest any excess cash

1. which one of the following would be an example of a supply-side market failure? a. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, and after the leak is discovered, the business immediately cleans up the pollution at its own expense. b. a gas station is slowly leaking diesel fuel from its underground tanks, but the state uses taxpayer money to clean up the pollution rather than requiring the business to pay. c. your business wants to attract repeat customers by putting on a customer-appreciation picnic at a public park, but you decide not to because you couldn't prevent noncustomers from consuming the food and entertainment you provided. d. everyone rushes to the local retail outlet at midnight on the day of the release of a new video game console, and the store runs out before everyone is able to buy one.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?