To vote or not to vote: mr. and mrs. ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." they each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). however, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote. (your answer should be in a table & identify the nash equilibrium)2. to vote or not to vote part ii: suppose mr. and mrs. ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow’s election. would such an agreement improve utility? would such an agreement be an equilibrium? (explain in approximately 100 words)

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Information on gerken power co., is shown below. assume the company’s tax rate is 40 percent. debt: 9,400 8.4 percent coupon bonds outstanding, $1,000 par value, 21 years to maturity, selling for 100.5 percent of par; the bonds make semiannual payments. common stock: 219,000 shares outstanding, selling for $83.90 per share; beta is 1.24. preferred stock: 12,900 shares of 5.95 percent preferred stock outstanding, currently selling for $97.10 per share. market: 7.2 percent market risk premium and 5 percent risk-free rate. required: calculate the company's wacc. (do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.) wacc %

Within the relevant range, if there is a change in the level of the cost driver, then a. total fixed costs will remain the same and total variable costs will change b. total fixed costs will change and total variable costs will remain the same c. total fixed costs and total variable costs will change d. total fixed costs and total variable costs will remain the same