To examine the trade-off between market efficiency and market power from a merger, consider a market with two firms that sell identical products. firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of $1, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of $2. the market demand is q = 105 - p. note that partial differential pi_1/partial differential q_1 = [105 - 1(q_1 + q_2)] - 1q_1 - 1 = 0 and partial differential pi_2/partial differential q_2 = [105 - 1(q_1 + q_2)] - 1q_2 - 2 = 0. the cournot-nash equilibrium occurs where q_1 equals and q_2 equals (enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) market output is furthermore, the equilibrium occurs at a price of $

The partnership of douglas, ryan, and ellen has dissolved and is in the process of liquidation. on july 1, 2016, just before the second cash distribution, the assets and equities of the partnership along with profit and loss sharing ratios were as follows: cash $30,000receivable - net $20,000inventories $25,000equipment - net $30,000total assets $80,000liabilities $12,000douglas, capital (20%) $28,000ryan, capital (50%) $24,000ellen, capital (30%) $16,000total liab./equity $80,000assume that the available cash is distributed immediately, except for a $2,000 contingency fund that is withheld pending complete liquidation of the partnership. how much cash should be paid to each of the partners? a. $3,200 douglas, $8,000 ryan, $4,800 ellenb. $5,600 douglas, $14,000 ryan, $8,400 ellenc. $16,000 douglas, $0 ryan, $0 ellend. $8,000 douglas, $0 ryan, $8,000 ellen