The equilibrium price in a market characterized by oligopoly is

Thomas kratzer is the purchasing manager for the headquarters of a large insurance company chain with a central inventory operation. thomas's fastest-moving inventory item has a demand of 6,000 units per year. the cost of each unit is $100, and the inventory carrying cost is $10 per unit per year. the average ordering cost is $30 per order. it takes about 5 days for an order to arrive, and the demand for 1 week is 120 units. (this is a corporate operation, and the are 250 working days per year.)a) what is the eoq? b) what is the average inventory if the eoq is used? c) what is the optimal number of orders per year? d) what is the optimal number of days in between any two orders? e) what is the annual cost of ordering and holding inventory? f) what is the total annual inventory cost, including cost of the 6,000 units?

R& m chatelaine is one of the largest tax-preparation firms in the united states. it wants to acquire the tax experts, a smaller rival. after the merger, chatelaine will be one of the two largest income-tax preparers in the u.s. market. what should chatelaine include in its acquisition plans? it should refocus its attention from the national to the international market. in addition to acquiring the tax experts, it should also determine the best way to drive independent "mom and pop" tax preparers out of business. chatelaine will need to explain to the federal trade commission how the acquisition will not result in an increase in prices for consumers. chatelaine should enter a price-based competition with its other major competitor to force it out of business and become a monopoly.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?